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THE DRAFTSMAN VIEWS WILLS FOR
A YOUNG FAMILY
JOHN H. MARTINt
Most articles, institutes and books about estate planning or drafting
testamentary instruments focus on substantial accumulations of wealth.1
Principal concerns are tax consequences and tax minimization. Very
little attention is paid to planning and drafting for the smaller, modest
estate-the one with less than $60,000 in value.' Nevertheless, the
average testator falls into this neglected category.3 While the small
amount of wealth presents few tax problems, this typical client has other
unique and perplexing problems. Unfortunately, he or she is usually
unable to afford much attorney time for planning the estate4 and solving
these difficulties. The lawyer, knowing that the client cannot afford (or
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This article was prepared with the assistance of a grant from the North Carolina
Law Center. Portions were presented as the Second Marvin K. and Florence T. Blount
Lecture on Estate Planning and Taxes at the University of North Carolina School of
Law, October 31, 1975.
1. One textbook, T. SHAFFER, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND
TRUSTS (1972), does examine the small, almost illusory wealth of the young family but
makes the same observation about the paucity of discussion about this category of client.
Id. at 59.
2. When a client's assets exceed $60,000 his death will require the filing of a
federal estate tax return. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6018(a). As the size of the gross
estate climbs above that figure, the significance of tax consequences increases and tax
considerations begin to influence the shape of the estate plan although, due to the
availability of the marital deduction, id. § 2056, a married person's estate generally will
not pay estate tax until its value is something in excess of $120,000. Since the necessity
of filing a return provokes some notice of tax ramifications and the smaller estate on
which this article will focus does not present federal tax problems, it seems appropriate
to define the smaller estate as one under $60,000 in value.
3. In the latest year for which statistics are available, 1972, estate tax returns
were required for about nine percent of all deaths. The comparable figure for 1969 was
seven percent. Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1975, at 1, col. 5. A recent study of probate
court records in Minnesota for the year 1969 disclosed that eighty-five percent of the
probate estates in a metropolitan county and ninety-four percent in three rural counties
were under $60,000 or less. Stein, Probate Administration Study: Some Emerging
Conclusions, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 596, 598 (1974).
4. This article will persist in calling the average person's collection of property
interests an estate. Moreover, the term "estate planning" will be used because it
communicates effectively the idea of developing comprehensive, thoughtful arrangements
for the devolution of property at death. In that regard the term is superior to the phrase
"drafting wills," for the effective reach of a will is much too narrow in this era of
multiple testamentary devices. Estate planning may be a highfalutin term to some, but
so long as it communicates basic meaning, it is not evasive. But cf. T. SHAFFER, supra
note 1, at 1.
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will not tolerate) much more than a nominal fee, often feels he cannot
put the time into the matter that he knows it ought to have. He is
tempted to reach for the published form books for a simple, stock
approach. But the rare consideration of this client's problems means the
attorney will find little guidance from that source.
This article deals with this large but neglected category of clients
and the problems that the attorney should face in preparing their wills.
In order to provide opportunity for a focused discussion, the coverage is
further refined to clients that are parents in a young family just getting a
start in life. The purpose here is to think through the difficult problems
and choices involved in counseling these persons about wills and to
reach some conclusions about the design their wills typically might take.
The analysis is intended to give the attorney a framework which he
might use as a standard approach for this type of client. The discussion
will examine the concerns of such persons, look at some possible pat-
terns of distribution for them, and, after analysis, suggest that one
particular pattern is better than others for use as a standard approach. A
prototype employing that suggested pattern will then be presented.
In the course of this examination a hypothetical family will be used and
the legal framework for the analysis will be current North Carolina law.
Several caveats are appropriate at the outset. The observations
made here and solutions advocated are deemed appropriate generaliza-
tions for the young family with modest assets. Advocacy of a standard
approach to persons in this category does not, however, relieve the
attorney from the obligation to investigate thoroughly the facts and
circumstances of the unique individuals before him and to tailor the
standard approach to their situation. While generalizations, standard
approaches and forms are necessary to enable the attorney to turn out a
quality product economically, the attorney must question the validity of
any approach or form-his own or from a form book-each time it is
used.5
A TYPICAL CLIENT COUPLE
Presented first are the essential facts about our representative
clients, R. Michael Wilson, wife Harriet Jones Wilson and their family.'
5. The admonition cannot be stated better than done by Professor Leach: "No
clause should appear in any will drawn by you unless you individually know precisely
what it means, what object it is designed to accomplish, what doctrine (if any) of the
law it grows out of, and how it furthers the testamentary intentions of this particular
client." Leach, Planning and Drafting a Will, 27 B.U.L. REv. 157, 158 (1947) (em-
phasis in original).
6. A harmonious relationship and common goals for husband and wife are
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This information is in summary form as it might be compiled during the
course of a conference between the attorney and Mr. and Mrs. Wilson.T
Personal Data:
Client: R. Michael Wilson, born 4-26-43 (age 32)
Spouse: Harriet Jones Wilson, born 8-2-44 (age 31)
Address: 1234 South Boulevard
Raleigh, North Carolina
Occupation: Assistant branch manager
Fidelity Savings Bank
Children: Joseph Paul Wilson, born 3-15-68 (age 7)
Christine Ann Wilson, born 7-7-70 (age 5)
Assets and Liabilities:
Jointly Held Assets:8  Cost9  Market Value
Home (acquired 1969)10 $31,000 $36,000
(Mortgage Bal-
ance: $25,000)
assumed. Needless to say, this is not always the case. The attorney must be sensitive to
signs of divergent opinion and talk with each of the parties separately if necessary, to
explore differences in desires. If the interests of the spouses differ or are in potential
conflict, the attorney faces a problem of professional responsibility. ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY, CANON No. 5 & EC 5-15, -16 & -19. See Panel Discus-
sion: Professional Ethics, U. Mirmi 8th INST. ON ESTATE PLANNING If 74.700, at 7-3 to
-9, -17 to -21 (1974).
7. The information here is indeed in summary form. The attorney usually will
have more extensive notes and will need to see documents to verify property facts about
which the client is unsure. In practice every attorney must develop a system (including
forms) for eliciting and recording these essential facts and develop the habit of
impressing on the client the importance of full disclosure. Being a good listener and
showing empathy are essential to this foundational stage of planning. See generally J.
FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 34-38 (3d ed. 1966); T. SHAFFER, supra note 1,
at 1-27. For the possibilities of using nonlawyer personnel in estate planning see
Mucklestone, The Legal Assistant in Estate Planning, 10 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J.
263 (1975).
8. The title to assets held jointly is deemed to contain the right of survivorship
feature which in North Carolina was abolished in 1784 as an automatic incident of the
joint tenancy. However, the right of survivorship can be created by agreement between
the parties. Vettori v. Fay, 262 N.C. 481, 137 S.E.2d 810 (1964); Bunting v. Cobb, 234
N.C. 132, 66 S.E.2d 661 (1951); Taylor v. Smith, 116 N.C. 531, 21 S.E. 202 (1895).
9. Cost basis figures should be obtained even though there likely will be few
suggestions for transfers of property with the smaller value estates. The cost basis
figures may disclose an unusual situation and may provide valuable information for
counseling in later years.
10. The gift tax consequences of the acquisition of real property by one spouse
where title is taken as joint tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants by the
entirety changed in 1955. Prior to that year, the gift, if any, took place on acquisition.
Since 1954 there is no gift until termination of the tenancy unless the parties elect to
have the gift recognized at the outset. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2515. While the
young family will not have real property acquired by husband and wife before 1955, the
attorney should be in the habit of asking the date of acquisition of real estate held by
clients.
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Household goods11  5,000 1,500
Savings account (Fidelity Bank) 12  2,300
Checking account 400
Series E bonds 800
Total13  $16,000
Michael has made all contributions to the joint assets.' 4
Separate Property-Michael:
Resort property (unimproved) $ 4,200 6,500
in Watauga County





All policies insure Michael and presently are payable in a lump
sum -to Harriet if she survives; Michaers estate is alternate beneficiary.
Face Company Type
$10,000 Mutual Help Life Ins. Co. Ordinary life
$20,000 Gibralter Life Assurance Co. Group term at Bank
Other Financial Information:
Salary: $11,800
Retirement Plan: Participant in Fidelity Savings Bank Pension Plan
(qualified under § 401 of Internal Revenue Code).
Harriet is beneficiary of death benefits.
Expected Inheritances: None.
Significant Liabilities: None other than home mortgage, noted above.
Accident Insurance: None.
Safety Deposit Box: #1278 at Beach Road Branch of Fidelity Savings
Bank.
11. Household goods are listed as joint property although there is no document of
title involved. In order for the right of survivorship to exist in personal property, there
must be a verbal contract to that effect. Cf. Taylor v. Smith, 116 N.C. 531, 21 S.E. 202
(1895). The author feels that if questioned, most couples would indicate such an
agreement or understanding existed between them. Therefore, treatment as joint assets
with right of survivorship is the most logical manner to handle household goods. It is
far more reasonable than arbitrarily to state all of them belong to one spouse to the
exclusion of the other. Cf. WACHOVIA BANK & ThusT Co., NORTH CAROLINA WILL
MANUAL SERVICE IV-3 (N. Wiggins ed.) [hereinafter cited as WACHOVIA WILL MANUAL].
12. This savings account is one which was established in accordance with N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1(a) (1966) and thus contains a right of survivorship and the
incidents described in id. § 41-2.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
13. Only the net equity is shown.
14. The source of the contribution is relevant to North Carolina inheritance tax,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(9) (1972), and to the spouse's right to dissent from the




1. Distribution of Property:
Each wants the other to have everything; then -to the children equally.
Children should not have possession until age 25.
Wife's ring to Christine.
Each wants to leave $250 to Suburban Community Church. Husband
wants to leave $250 to Red Cross preferably for disaster relief.
2. Guardians for Children:
First Choice: Wife's -brother James R. Jones and his wife Gertrude E.
Jones of Alexandria, Virginia. Second Choice: Husband's sister Norma W.
Thornberry and her husband Robert J. Thornberry of Asheville, North Caro-
lina.
3. Fiduciaries:
Each other as personal representative; then Worthy Bank & Trust Com-
pany. Also Bank as trustee.
ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS OF DISTRIBUTION
The desires and objectives of the clients dictate the ultimate choice
of a dispositive scheme. However, the desires outlined above and those
of most clients can be fulfilled with varying degrees of success in a
number of different ways. Examination will be made of several pat-
terns of distribution that should be considered. As this is done the
strengths and weaknesses of each alternative will be mentioned.
A. No Will-Rights of Survivorship and Intestate Succession
A threshold question must be whether the Wilsons need to execute
wills. The vast bulk of their property is in some form of joint tenancy
with right of survivorship. Thus, the survivor will automatically suc-
ceed to this property at the death of the first to die. On that point the
presence or absence of a will is irrelevant.", Moreover, if the surviving
spouse should die intestate shortly thereafter, the property would pass in
15. Some of the desires are stated in an ambiguous form, much as a client might
do. This will allow discussion infra about alternative solutions. Much of the informa-
tion in this section is obtained from the client very slowly. Indeed, the clients do not
think of many of the problems, e.g., time to give possession and testamentary guardians,
until they are suggested by the attorney.
16. A will could affect the joint tenancy property if the will forced an election.
When the decedent in his will gives the joint tenancy property to a third person and gives
other, separately owned property to the surviving joint tenant, the survivor must elect to
take under the will (and accept the transfer of the joint property to the third party) or to
take the joint property by right of survivorship (and turn down the gift in the will of the
separate property). Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Burus, 230 N.C. 592, 55 S.E.2d 183
(1949).
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equal shares to the children.17  This distribution (all to the other, then
to the children) conforms exactly to the primary desire of the clients.
However, there appear to be some client objectives that are not met. One
desire is that the children not obtain possession of any property until
attaining age twenty-five. If the surviving parent should die before a
child is eighteen, there must be a guardian appointed to receive the
share of any child who is under that age. 18 Moreover, if both parents
were dead, each child would receive his or her full share outright at age
eighteen."' The Wilsons, like many other parents, harbor the idea that
this age is not an ideal one for turning over to a child a signficant
amount of property. Without a will the desired holdback to age twenty-
five cannot be achieved.
Another weakness of the status quo is found in the treatment of the
separate property owned by Michael. His unimproved resort lot and his
automobile would pass by intestacy. The small estate proceedings are
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-15(2), -16(1) (1966).
18. It would appear that a guardian would not be required if id. § 32-27(28)
is incorporated into the will by appropriate reference. That section authorizes a
fiduciary to make payments directly to a minor or to another who has care and
custody of the minor. Taken literally the entire share due a minor could be paid to
him or her without appointment of a legal guardian. The statutory power stipulates the
fiduciary is protected against liability so long as "the fiduciary exercised clue care in the
selection of the [recipient]." In addition, even a minor's receipt is full acquittance. Orj
the other hand, it is possible this statutory power was intended only to obviate the
necessity of a legal guardian when modest periodic payments are due a minor. This
restrictive interpretation would be more compatible with the public policy expressed in
id. § 33-1 (that a guardian should be appointed), the common law approach that a third
party may not weaken the rights of an infant (here his right to disaffirm his receipt)
unless authorized by law to do so (the statutory power possibly could be read as such an
authorization), and the new provision of id. § 28A-22-7 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (au-
thorizing payment to a parent or guardian of bequests up to $1,500 made to a minor).
If the clients do not execute wills, the statutory powers, of course, are not
incorporated into their testamentary plans. Since the powers of the personal representa-
tive under id. § 28A-13-3 (Cum. Supp. 1975) do not include power to distribute
to or for the benefit of a minor, appointment of a guardian of the minor's estate
would be required in order to effect distribution unless (1) the sum is less than
$2,000 in which case the recipient may be the public guardian or clerk of superior court
on behalf of the minor, id. § 7A-111 (Cum. Supp. 1975) or (2) the sum is less than
$1,500 in which case id. § 28A-22-7 (Cum. Supp. 1975) would be applicable. The
same situation would exist if a will is executed but the power of id. § 32-27(28)
(1966) is not incorporated into the will. This author believes that a guardian is
necessary where that statutory power is not incorporated and the statutory facility of
payment provisions are not applicable even if the testator stipulates "it shall not be
necessary for my executor at any time to have a guardian appointed for any beneficiary
with respect to the disbursement of income or principal or other property to or for such
beneficiary." See NoRTH CAROLINA NAT'L BANK, WILL & TRUST MANUAL C-3 (1975)
for such a provision. That provision attempts to take from a minor the protection
conferred by the whole concept of disability and does so without statutory authority.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-41 (1966); id. § 48A-2 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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not available to transfer real estate"0 and the necessity for probate of the
realty probably deprives the beneficiaries of the direct, noncourt transfer
of the automobile. 2 ' Additionally, the necessary application of the
Intestate Succession Act22 to Michael's separate property results in an
undesirable fragmentation of ownership. 23  His spouse, Harriet, will
receive an undivided one-third interest in the net estate,24 and each child
will receive a one-third fractional interest.2 The result is declared
undesirable because it contradicts the expressed objective of these clients
that the surviving spouse receive all the property. 26 Another unattrac-
tive result is the difficult problems created by multiple ownership of the
pioperty. Since this is a modest estate, it is almost certain that the wife
would need to sell the lot and use the proceeds for the support of herself
and the children. That disposition may be thwarted by the split owner-
ship; certainly use and transfer is made more complicated, particularly
since two of the owners could act until age eighteen only through a
court-appointed guardian.
20. Id. § 28A-25-1(a). The statute seems to indicate that the affidavit pro-
cedure could be used to collect personal property having less than $5,000 total
value even where the intestate decedent also owned real estate. Nevertheless, it is
clear these proceedings would not clear title to real estate. The unfortunate reference to
real estate in section 28A-25-1 (a) apparently resulted when the legislature chose to
disregard the recommendation of the General Statutes Commission that the small estates
procedure cover both personal and real property. See Lee, The Administration of
Decedents' Estates in North Carolina-Article 25--Small Estates, 11 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 67, 70 (1975).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-77(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Read literally, the statute
permits assignment of the automobile before an administrator qualifies. However, the
special transfer provisions should apply only when administration has not been under-
taken and is unnecessary.
22. Id. §§ 29-13 to -15 (1966).
23. When only a small amount of property is involved, often the fragmentation can
be avoided through assignment of the entire value to the spouse as her year's allowance.
Id. § 30-15 (Cum. Supp. 1975). However, personal property alone is subject to assign-
ment as the allowance, id. § 30-18 (1966).
24. Id. § 29-14(2).
25. Id. § 29-15(2), -16(1).
26. This objective is not based upon an arbitrary assumption but upon studies
which disclose that the "all to the spouse" pattern is a common desire in a small estate.
M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES, & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 83-95 (1970);
Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U.
CHI. L. REv. 241, 252 (1962); Stein, supra note 3, at 602-03. The UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE § 2-102 contains an intestate succession provision which conforms to this general
intent that the spouse receive all of a small estate.
27. A sale or mortgage of the ward's estate can be effected only upon approval,
after petition and hearing, by the judge of the superior court of the county in which the
property is situated. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-31 (Cum. Supp. 1975); see Pike v. Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1, 11, 161 S.E.2d 453, 462 (1968). If the real estate is in a
county other than the county of the guardian's residence, application must be made both
to the clerk of the court of the guardian's residence and to the superior court of the
county where the real estate is located. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-31.1 (1966).
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At this point the attorney may be tempted to advise Michael to put
his resort lot into joint tenancy, let everything go to the surviving spouse
by operation of law,2 and thereby avoid the laws of intestacy. That
nicely takes care of the disposition of the property on the death of the
first to die. But offsetting that advantage is the realization that the
children might still obtain their shares before age twenty-five and that a
guardianship could be required for the children's property. Both possi-
bilities are dependent on the time the surviving parent dies. Moreover,
such a tempting suggestion does not cure a third defect in the status
quo-the uncertain care and custody of the children should both parents
die while their offspring are still minors. If both parents are dead, a
guardian of the person should be appointed for any child who is a
minor.29 While the clerk of the superior court has the power and
authority to make the official appointment,80 the legislature has given
the father, 1 and in some cases the mother, 2 the right to nominate 8 a
28. The automobile could be transferred by affidavit executed by all heirs and filed
with the Department of Motor Vehicles. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-77(b) (Cum. Supp.
1975). The wife could execute the affidavit on behalf of the minor children. Id.
29. Id. § 33-1, -6 (1966) recognizes there are two types of guardians for a minor:
the guardian of the estate and the guardian of the person. The same individual or entity
could serve in both capacities although the dual service is not required. While a
corporate fiduciary likely would not agree to act as guardian of the person, the statutory
authorization for a bank to act as a fiduciary does not preclude a bank from serving as
guardian of the person. Id. § 53-159 (1975).
30. Id. § 33-1 (1966).
31. Id. § 33-2 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
32. The statute, in pertinent part, provides: "Any father ... may, by his last will
and testament in writing, if the mother be dead, dispose of the custody and tuition of any
of his infant children .... Or in case the father is dead and has not exercised his said
right of appointment, or has wilfully abandoned his wife, then the mother ... may do
so." Id. Arguably, the intent is that the surviving parent is to have the right to appoint
a testamentary guardian. However, the mother's right literally is conditioned on
nonexercise by the father as well as the father's prior death. This seems to preclude an
appointment by the mother if the father made an appointment in his will but died first.
There does not appear to have been any consideration whether the statute is to be read
literally. As a practical matter, if the mother made a nomination in her will, the clerk
of the superior court almost certainly would consider it before making the official
appointment.
33. The nomination in the will probably is not a conclusive appointment. While
N.C. Gmr. STAT. § 33-2 (Cum. Supp. 1975) speaks of the parent's ability to "dispose of
the custody and tuition," the clerk of the superior court has jurisdiction over the appoint-
ment of guardians, id. § 33-1 (1966), and over the probate of the will (in which the par-
ent's selection appears), id. § 28A-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975). North Carolina has not de-
cided whether the guardian obtains his authority from the nomination in the will or the
designation by the clerk. Nevertheless, the great majority of the jurisdictions that have
considered this question have decided the guardian's authority comes from designation by
the judicial officer, the designation in the will being a mere nomination. The welfare of
the child should control the appointment; thus, the court could select another person if
that were in the best interest of the child. See, e.g., Rotter v. Rotter, 93 Idaho 462, 463
P.2d 928 (1970); In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 1970); Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 803
(1959).
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testamentary guardian for the minor child or children. The nomination
by the parent must be in a will." Thus, there exists a strong incentive
to make wills for a couple (or a surviving single parent)35 who wish to
designate a particular person as guardian and thereby, in a practical
sense, forestall any family battle over custody of orphaned children. This
incentive is present even though it is clear that the will of the first parent
to die is expected to have minimal or no effect on the transfer of
property to the surviving spouse.
In summary, the status quo--no will, joint property to pass by the
survivorship feature and separate property to pass by intestacy--does
not appear to be the alternative of choice for our clients. While most of
their assets would pass to the survivor, some portions would go to the
children and likely precipitate the need for a guardian of the estate for
each; the distribution to the children on the death of the survivor would
be outright, potentially at too young an age; and the status quo would
not take care of naming a guardian of the person for a child who is a
minor when both. parents are dead.36
B. Simple Will: Outright Gifts to Spouse or to Children
The classic simple will gives outright gifts and has no complex
provisions creating future interests or establishing trusts. Such a pattern
34. See note 32 supra. The statute permits no other device by which a parent can
make a nomination. This creates a problem for a parent under the age of eighteen.
While this statute permits a father "though he be a minor" or a mother "whether of full
age or a minor" to make the appointment, a person under age eighteen cannot make a
will. N.C. GEN. STAT.'§ 31.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
35. Other problems arise for the client who is a divorced parent of minor children.
One of the situations in which the mother is given the right to appoint arises from
"wilfull abandonment" of the wife by the father of the children. Id. § 33-2, see note 32
supra. It is not clear whether a separation or divorce decree based on wilfull abandon-
ment is necessary. In addition, the effect of a divorce on other grounds upon the right
of either parent to appoint a guardian is not mentioned in the statute or considered in
any North Carolina case. It is possible that divorce on grounds other than abandonment
has no effect on the right to appoint and the father retains the primary privilege. Since
it is most likely the clerk has the final say in making the appointment, see note 33 supra,
the practical approach would be to insert an appointment in the will of the client
whether the client is the divorced mother or father.
36. It is appropriate to note that the scheme of intestate distribution under the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) might lead us, if we were in a state that had adopted the
UPC, to advise the Wilsons that wills are not necessary for their situation. The UPC
provides that the surviving spouse takes the first $50,000 plus one-half the balance of the
estate. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102. Additionally, the testamentary guardian
seems to take his authority from the appointment in the will. Id. § 5-202. While
many features of the UPC are found in North Carolina already (particularly informal
estate settlement), other portions of the UPC (specifically guardianship) might be
attractive for this tate,
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of disposition would be better than intestacy for the Wilsons. The
outright gift to the spouse would avoid the problems of split ownership
in the resort lot, and the testamentary guardian for the children could be
named in the will of each parent.
While some of the weaknesses of the status quo are cured by the
simple, outright gift to the surviving spouse, other deficiencies remain.
The transfer of property to the children which will occur on the death of
the second parent to die is not yet in an acceptable form. If the children
are minors when the transfer to them takes effect, the awkwardness and
expense of a guardian for their property will be required. Even if they
then are adults, they might be under age twenty-five, which is the first
point at which the parents feel it is appropriate for them to control
property. Consequently, it appears the simple will with outright trans-
fer to the surviving spouse or, if there is none, to the children, is an
unacceptable dispositive scheme. Something more is required to meet
the clients' objectives.
C. Successive Estates-Legal or Equitable-In Spouse and Children
Our clients seem content to let the survivor have complete control
of all -the assets. Each appears to have full confidence that the other
will use wisely the property for his or her own needs and those of the
children,3 7 leaving to the children or more remote descendants anything
that might be left. However, it is possible that discussion with the
clients would reveal that one or both would actually like not only to care
for the survivor's needs but also to control the transfer of property at the
death of the second to die.3 8 A device for trying to reconcile both
objectives is the creation of a legal life estate coupled with some type of
power in the life tenant to consume or dispose followed by legal future
interests in children or issue.39 However, should exploration with the
client reveal these twin desires, not only should the depth and strength
of this desire be ascertained, but, in addition, there should be empha-
sized the shortcomings of such a division of legal title.
37. The surviving parent regardless of sex does, of course, owe the duty of support
to any minor children. See Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374, 126 S.E.2d 113
(1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-3 (1966).
38. Most young couples realize the likelihood the survivor will remarry. Thus, there
is reason to suspect the new mate will be given the property or that children of the
second marriage would be additional beneficiaries. Another reason for avoiding outright
disposition to the survivor is the fear that he or she will be unable to manage and invest
wisely. However, beneficial interests may be better vehicles than legal interests for
resolving this concern. See text accompanying notes 40-47 infra.
39. 0. BROWDER, L. WAGGONER, & R. WELLMAN, FAMILY PROPERTY SETrLEMENTS
-FTURE INTEREsrS 491 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as BROwDER].
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A primary problem with division of legal title lies in the classifica-
tion of the interests created. A general devise or bequest is said to
transmit absolute ownership even though there may be an inconsistent,
subsequent limitation over.4" On the other hand, a clear intent to give a
lesser estate will be recognized, and the life estate will not be enlarged to
a fee absolute even when coupled with an unrestricted power of disposi-
tion in the life tenant.41 Although clear expression of intent should
yield the anticipated result, there is obvious potential for both unexpected
classification and a challenge by someone who perceives correctly
that the variations in decisions gives any challenge a particular nuisance
value.42 Even when the classification of estates is clear, and the
surviving spouse winds up with the intended life estate and power of use
and disposition, a second problem is to define the scope of those
powers.4" Examples of problems that plague such interests include
doubt about the purposes for which the property may be used44 and the
division of and restrictions upon proceeds of sale.45
The uncertainty in classification and interpretation are sufficient
reasons for avoiding creation of legal future interests. However, for
clients such as the Wilsons, other reasons also exist. Since the will of
the first to die has no direct effect on the property passing by right of
survivorship, a plan to give the survivor only a life estate can be
implemented effectively only by severing the joint tenancies and tenan-
cies by the entireties. Such a severance is not likely to meet the
emotional or psychological needs of the young couple.46  Yet another
40. Quickel v. Quickel, 261 N.C. 696, 136 S.E.2d 52 (1964); Clark v. Connor, 253
N.C. 515, 117 S.E.2d 465 (1960) (both applying N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-38 (1966)).
41. E.g., Rudisill v. Hoyle, 254 N.C. 33, 118 S.E.2d 145 (1961); Howell v.
Alexander, 3 N.C. App. 371, 165 S.E.2d 256 (1969); 1 AMERICAN IAw op PROPERTY §
2.15 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
42. The frequent necessity for litigation to determine whether the language used
meant to transfer an interest absolutely or for a limited period gives pause for contempla-
tion. So too is the fact that prior constructions of words and phrases have little
precedential value. See Clark v. Connor, 253 N.C. 515, 520, 117 S.E.2d 465, 468
(1960).
43. BRownER, supra note 39, at 492.
44. See Hill v. Hill, 19 N.C. App. 42, 197 S.E.2d 886 (1973); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d
169 (1970).
45. E.g., Langston v. Barfield, 231 N.C. 594, 58 S.E.2d 361 (1950); Darden v.
Matthews, 173 N.C. 186, 91 S.E. 835 (1917).
46. While today's concept of a married couple is not the same as under the
common law, nevertheless, many couples see themselves as a unit and consider each as
having identical rights in all their property. Joint ownership facilitates and confirms this
image of themselves. A sense of loss and insecurity can result from termination of
joint tenancies and tenancies by the entireties. Of course, tax considerations may
compel terminations. But on these occasions the attorney needs to be sensitive to the
emotional feelings of the clients.
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reason for rejecting successive legal estates is the availability of a better
vehicle to accomplish the same objectives, viz., a trust. Problems of
classification and interpretation are more easily avoided with a trust, and
it is a more flexible vehicle for meeting the needs of the spouse.
Moreover, the presence of a third party trustee means not only better
protection of the remaindermen's interests but also independent man-
agement and investment service for the spouse-life tenant. In addition,
a trust permits the coordination of life insurance proceeds with the other
property interests. All types of property thus can be managed as one
unit. If successive legal estates were used the life insurance proceeds
would necessarily be handled separately either through lump sum pay-
ment to the wife (giving her absolute ownership which is contrary to the
express reason for selecting a life estate for her in the other property) or
one of the policy settlement options (a generally inflexible arrange-
ment).17 Thus, if there is a desire to give the surviving spouse less than
full and absolute control over the assets, the trust is a device superior to
successive legal estates.
Despite its significant comparative advantages, the use of a trust
upon the death of the first spouse to die is questionable for most young
families with modest assets. Joint tenancy arrangements appeal to them
and provide inexpensive, quick transfers. Each spouse wants the other
to have complete freedom to use and consume the property and has
confidence the balance will ultimately pass to the issue of the marriage.
Unless a spouse has a particular need for protection or management
services, any management or investment problems that can be foreseen
with respect to the life insurance proceeds do not usually compel the
selection of a trust. The marriage partner is viewed as capable of
making the choices for investment or can be depended upon to seek help
as it is needed."8
D. Outright to Spouse; Contingent Trust for Children
The foregoing discussion has emphasized the desire of the clients
for the survivor of them to have absolute ownership of all property but
has shown that several modes for achieving this objective conflict with
other client goals, particularly the desire to postpone ultimate possession
47. The characteristics of common life insurance policy options are discussed in J.
FARR, supra note 7, at 43-54.
48. The survivor, of course, could establish a trust to provide management and
investment services plus the assistance of a third party in making decisions about the use
of both income and corpus for the survivor's needs.
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by the children until age twenty-five, the desire for avoiding a guardian
of the property for minor children, the preference for nominating a
guardian of the person, and the hope for certainty in result. Several
possible patterns of distribution have been rejected because they contain
significant weaknesses.
Next, a look is taken at a plan which is more complex but which is
geared to the different objectives sought on the contingency of the
spouse surviving or failing to survive. Specifically, this calls for a will
providing for outright distribution to the spouse, if the spouse survives;
if the spouse fails to survive, the property is to go to the children (and
issue of deceased children) with a provision for establishment of a trust
only in the event a taker has not attained age twenty-five. With this
dispositive scheme, the survivor obtains full ownership of all property
that was in the separate name of the first to die and, of course,
automatically receives the same in all property held in joint ownership
with right of survivorship. Also, the life insurance proceeds would be
paid outright to the surviving spouse. In the event the spouse failed to
survive, children and issue of deceased children take outright if age
twenty-five or older, while the shares for those who are younger pass
into trust. If the husband is the last parent to die so the insurance
proceeds on his life are not available until the time has come for the
children to take, the trustee would be the recipient of the proceeds and
would make allocation of them. This contingency can be anticipated by
now naming the issue and the trustee as contingent beneficiaries on the
insurance policies (the wife being the primary beneficiary).49 Since the
49. Some difficulties could be encountered in naming a testamentary trustee as
contingent beneficiary of insurance proceeds. Since a will speaks from death, its
provisions including those establishing a testamentary trust have no effect until the client
dies. It follows, of course, that the trust under the will is not in existence and the named
trustee has no authority at the time the policy beneficiary designation is made or at the
time the insured dies. Indeed, the trust may not exist until the clerk of the superior court
appoints the trustee and thereby constitutes the trust. Consequently, there is no
beneficiary to take under the designation. However, it could be argued that the clerk's
appointment of the testamentary trustee should be viewed as relating back to the moment
of the insured's death. The rights of the testamentary trustee to take the property
designated for it come into fruition at the moment of death to the same extent as do
rights of other beneficiaries. If this view is accepted the trust does exist at moment of
death and there should be a proper beneficiary under the insurance policy. Moreover,
the fact that policy proceeds are not payable until the insured's death does not make
the beneficiary designation a purely testamentary action that is void for failure to
comply with formalities required for execution of a will. A beneficiary designation
should be viewed as the exercise of a contractual right given by the insurance policy
and not a testamentary disposition. Nevertheless, it must be noted that N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-47 (Supp. 1975), which authorizes a devise or bequest to a trust, stipulates that the
trust must exist at the time of testator's death. It is not at all certain that this authority
to pour-over from a will to an existing inter vivos trust impliedly prohibits an inter
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order of death is fortuitous and the survivor could die before there is an
opportunity to execute a new estate plan, both husband and wife should
have separate wills that give absolute ownership to the survivor and es-
vivos designation of a testamentary trustee as recipient of nonprobate property. How-
ever, due to the technical challenges that may be made, commentators have indicated
that designation of testamentary trustees should not be attempted without legislative
sanction. T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 245-46; Link, Problems of Minors in Estate
Planning, in N.C. BAR ASS'N INST. ON ESTATE PLANNING AND DnAhrNG VII-19 (1972).
Before such a negative conclusion is reached, the ramifications of the designation of
the testamentary trustee ought to be explored in the context of the facts facing the
attorney. If the next alternative beneficiary after the testamentary trustee is the
insured's estate, the proceeds still will wind up where they are meant to be-in the
testamentary trust. In the meantime those proceeds may be exposed to the spouse's
elective rights and claims of creditors but that fact is of no consequence in the vast
majority of the estates because the spouse is pleased with the distribution under the will
and the estate is solvent. When the payment to the trustee will occur, as here, only in
the event there is no surviving spouse, there are no elective rights existent. The chief
disadvantage then to an unexpected payment to the personal representative is the loss of
the inheritance tax exemption for insurance paid directly to Class A takers, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 105-3(4), -4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975), and the commissions payable to
the personal representative. Moreover, proceeds of group policies will be exposed
to creditors' claims if paid to the insured's estate. Id. § 58-213 (1975). Very
likely, however, additional expense is the worst that will happen. And that will
come to pass only if the life insurance company balks at payment to the testa-
mentary trustee, the North Carolina Department of Revenue takes up the matter,
or the executor decides to challenge the arrangement. This observer contends that
an executor determined to carry out testator's clear intent will immediately have the
trustee appointed and have the proceeds paid directly to the trustee notwithstanding its
acknowledgement that a theoretical problem exists. However, even the draftsman with
eternal optimism needs to anticipate the worst. The beneficiary designation filed with
the insurance company can anticipate that the company might raise a question then or
later at the insured's death. A provision might also be inserted into the will to give the
executor guidance in case there is a successful challenge. The following forms are
offered as possibilities to be used in and with a will having a residuary clause and a trust
of the same design as in Articles III and IV infra:
Beneficiary designation: Primary beneficiary-Spouse of the insured if he or she
survives. Secondary beneficiary-"Issue of the insured who survive him, per stirpes,
provided that if any has not attained the age of twenty-five years his share shall be paid
to the trustee under the insured's will; provided, further, that if the trust under insured's
will is not established within six months after insured's death or if, for any reason, the
company or a court concludes payment cannot be made to the testamentary trustee,
payment of such share shall be made to insured's estate."
Provision for will (under Miscellaneous article): "Insurance: Certain policies of
insurance on 'my life name my wife as primary beneficiary and my surviving issue, per
stirpes, as contingent beneficiaries with a proviso that the share of any taker under the
age of twenty-five be paid to the trustee under this will. A further proviso permits
payment to my estate if the trust is not established within six months of my death or the
insurer concludes payment cannot be made to the trustee.
Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary relative to the distribution of my
property, if insurance proceeds are paid to my estate pursuant to the contingent
beneficiary designation, they shall be allocated to the testamentary trust established
under Article IV without further subdivision."
The same problems may be presented by the payment of employee death benefits to
a testamentary trustee.
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tablish a trust if the children are under the chosen age when the survivor
dies.
There are a number of problems that arise in the course of drafting
a will of this type. In order to highlight these, and some drafting
problems common to wills generally, the various portions of the will
should be examined seriatim. This discussion will be done in narrative
form following each provision of a prototype will, using the husband's as
the example.




I, Roy Michael Wilson (also known as R. Michael Wilson), a
domiciliary of the City of Raleigh, Wake County, North Carolina,
declare this is my will and revoke all my previous wills and codicils.
Comment on Preamble
The opening paragraph should identify the testator with his full
legal name and the name(s) in which he has taken title to property.
Stating the place of his domicile will assist in establishing that fact
should a dispute arise."' That statement may also determine proper
50. Domicile is a question of intent. The statement in the will is not conclusive7,
but is one factor to be considered along with others such as location of voter registration,
automobile registration, driver's license, and address used for filing tax returns. Domi-
cile may become particularly important when each of two or more jurisdictions asserts
decedent was one of its domiciliaries and levies an inheritance tax accordingly. Two
Uniform Acts aid in settling multijurisdictional disputes over domicile. One is the
Uniform Act on Interstate Arbitration of Death Taxes adopted in fourteen states:
California, CAr- REv. & TAX CODE § 14197-14197.13 (West 1970); Colorado, COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 39-24-101 to -114 (1973); Connecticut, CONN. Gm. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-
372, -374 (1972); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3911-24 (1964); Maryland,
MD. ANN. CODE 81, H9 177-89 (1975); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. Lws ch. 65B, H9 1-7
(1971); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. H§ 7.592(1)-(7) (1971); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 291.41-.42, .45 (1972); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2490.1-.15
(1964); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1638 to -1643 (1955); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, H9 7101-11 (1970); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 58.217.1-.14 (1971);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 83.14.010-.070 (1961); and West Virginia, W.
VA. CODE ANN. H 11-1113-1 to -14 (1974). The other is the Uniform Interstate
Compromise of Death Taxes Act adopted in eighteen states: California, CAL. REv. &
TAX CODE §§ 14195-14195.4 (West 1970); Colorado, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. H9 39-24-101
to -114 (1973); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-372 to -373 (1972); Illinois,
Ix.. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 399a (Smith-Hurd 1974); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
36, § 3981-85 (1964); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 190-93 (1975); Massa-
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venue for probate purposes.51
The revocation clause should be inserted routinely in all new wills.
The clause will negate any possible effect of a long forgotten will such as
one executed when inducted into military service and will avoid asser-
tions that a prior dispositive plan should be given partial effect by
integration with the new will.
I
SPECIFIC BEQUESTS
I bequeath Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250) to the Trustees
of Suburban Community Church of Raleigh, North Carolina.
I bequeath Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250) to the Wake County
Chapter of The American Red Cross and express my desire
(which is precatory only) that this be used for disaster relief.
Comment on Article I
Small gifts for benevolent purposes can create large problems. At
common law and in some jurisdictions today, an unincorporated associa-
tion lacks capacity to hold title.52 If the recipient in North Carolina is a
nonprofit unincorporated association, the transfer may be directly into
the common name of the entity.53  However, if there exists a parent
organization legally capable of taking title, a bequest may be treated as a
gift in trust to the parent for the benefit of the unincorporated associa-
tion.5 Religious societies, even though unincorporated, may receive,
hold and convey property through elected trustees.5 5 But if the church
is part of a denomination which authorizes a bishop or other ecclesiasti-
chusetts, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 65B, §§ 1-7 (1971); Michigan, MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§
7.592(1)-(7) (1971); Minnesota, M-N. STAT. ANN. §§ 291.41-.42, .45 (1972); New
Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.71 (1955); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
54.38A-1 to -2 (1960); New York, N.Y. TAx. LAw § 249-o (McKinney 1966);
Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 2490.1-.15 (1964); Tennessee, TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-1638 to -1640 (1955); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 7201-03 (1970);
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-217.1-.14 (1971); Washington, WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 83.14.010-.070 (1961); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-11A-1 to -5
(1974).
51. The county of domicile is proper venue for probate if the decedent was
domiciled in North Carolina; for a nondomiciliary who left property in North Carolina
proper venue is in any county in which his property is located. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-
3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
52. See 1 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 130-135 (rev. ed. 1973).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 39-24 to-26 (1966).
54. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Natl Missions, 226 N.C. 546, 39
S.E.2d 621 (1946).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 61-1 to -4 (1975).
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cal officer to hold title to its assets, that official should be designated as
recipient.5" These variations indicate that the draftsman must exercise
diligence in ascertaining the nature and status of the organization the
client wishes to benefit. Similar care must be taken in naming the entity
so that no dispute arises with regard to the identity o[ the client's
choice."
The second specific bequest deserves two comments. The designa-
tion of a local branch of a parent national charity clearly obviates any
question of an exemption for North Carolina inheritance tax purposes,
although a gift to the national organization would yield the same result
when it is clear the parent carries on religious, educational or charitable
activities in this state.5" An expression of hope or desire together with a
clear indication of precatory intent should be made to negate the infer-
ence a trust is intended.
5 9
WIFE SURVIVING
If my wife Harriet J. Wilson survives me, I devise, 'bequeath and
56. Id. § 61-5.
57. See Redd v. Taylor, 270 N.C. 14, 153 S.E.2d 761 (1967).
58. Testamentary transfers for religious, educational or charitable purposes are
exempt from North Carolina inheritance tax if the recipient organization is within the
state and is nonprofit. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-3(2) (1972). The exemption for
transfers to foreign nonprofit organizations is more restrictive. The foreign recipient
must be a corporation, foundation or trust and either (1) the other jurisdiction must give
a reciprocal exemption for transfers in the foreign state to North Carolina charitable
entities, or (2) the entity must be "one receiving and disbursing funds donated in this
State for religious, educational or charitable purposes." Id. § 105-3(3). The quoted
phrase is not free from interpretive difficulty. It may state a requirement that the
foreign charity be one which engages in charitable work in North Carolina. A Survey of
Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1939, 17 N.C.L. REv. 327, 382 (1939). An
exemption for transfers to foreign charities conditioned upon benefits receivable in the
granting jurisdiction does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Board of Educ. v. Illinois, 203 U.S. 553
(1906). However, if the foreign charitable entity has qualified to do business within the
state it cannot be discriminated against solely because of its foreign establishment.
WHYY, Inc. v. Borough.of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968).
59. Language of request rather than direct command can be interpreted as a polite
direction that a trust be created. The modem tendency, however, is to treat language of
hope and desire as nonbinding expressions of motive. See 1 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS §§ 25-
25.2 (3d ed. 1967). While the North Carolina cases repeatedly state that precatory
words will not be construed to establish a trust unless the circumstances indicate they
were used in an imperative sense, the draftsman must ascertain the client's exact intent
and state it beyond question. Decisions finding no intent to create a trust include
YWCA v. Morgan, 281 N.C. 485, 189 S.E.2d 169 (1972); Quickel v. Quickel, 261 N.C.
696, 136 S.E.2d 52 (1964); Carter v. Strickland, 165 N.C. 69, 80 S.E. 961 (1914); and
St. James v. Bagley, 138 N.C. 384, 50 S.E. 841 (1905). However, a devise on a stated
purpose was determined to create a trust in Wilson v. First Presbyterian Church, 284
N.C. 284, 200 S.E.2d 769 (1973).
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appoint to her all property which I own,"0 or over which I have
a testamentary power of appointment.
Comment on Article II
A so-called "blind exercise" of any power of appointment held by
the testator has been added to the transfer of all property to the
surviving spouse. This is designed to exercise powers of which the
testator is unaware when executing the will. While some respected
commentators advise against blind exercises,"' the reasons they give,
both tax and nontax, for nonexercise 2 seem outweighed by the testator's
desire to leave everything to the maximum extent of his ability to the
takers of his choice.0 In North Carolina a residuary clause silent on
this point will act as an exercise of all general powers of appointment
unless a contrary intent appears elsewhere in the will. 4  Thus, the
explicit exercise here confirms the statutory directive as to general
powers and exercises all unknown special powers.
I
WIFE FAILING TO SURVIVE
If my said wife does not survive me:
Tangible Personal Property: I bequeath in equal shares to my
children who survive me such of my tangible personal property
as shall, in the opinion of my Executor, be appropriate for distri-
bution to them either at the time my estate is distributed or at
a later date. If an item is appropriate for distribution at a later
date, it shall be distributed as part of the residue of my estate
and be held by my Trustee until the time appropriate for distribu-
tion arrives.
60. There is no need to describe the property as owned at the time of testators
death since it is clear under statutory law that property acquired after the will's execution
is included in the dispositive provisions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-41 (1966).
61. See, e.g., W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, FuTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 961
(1961); Casner, Estate Planning-Powers of Appointment, 64 HARV. L. REV. 185, 202-
03 (1950).
62. Arguments against exercise of unknown powers include (1) increase in federal
estate tax caused by the exercise of a general power created prior to October 21, 1942,
see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041; (2) exposure of the appointive property to
testators creditors; and (3) possibility the blind exercise may be ineffective.
63. A good discussion of the problem of blind exercise is found in Rabin, Blind
Exercises of Powers of Appointment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1965).
64. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunt, 267 N.C. 173, 148 S.E.2d 41 (1966);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-43 (1966) (which has been interpreted to apply only to general
powers of appointment).
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In the interest of family harmony, I state that I have not
promised any particular thing to any person. Therefore, if some
or all of my tangible personalty is appropriate for division among
my children and there is dispute as to which items each should
receive, I recommend but do not require that all such items of
tangible personalty be appraised and that the children then select
in rotation (my personal representative selecting for any person
unable to act for himself), items at the appraised value, the order
of choice to be determined by lot.
Residue: I devise, bequeath and appoint all other property which
I own, or over which I have a testamentary power of appoint-
ment, to and for the benefit of my issue, me surviving, as follows:
To each who has attained the age of twenty-five (25) years,"
the share which he would take if all such property then were being
distributed to my issue, me surviving, per stirpes. 66
To my Trustee hereinafter named, the balance of such prop-
erty, to be held, administered and distributed as provided in the
article of this will entitled Trust For Issue.
Comment on Article III
Tangible Personal Property. The words "personal property" are
unclear in meaning.67 The phrase "tangible personal property" should
be free from ambiguity although if the client normally has a significant
amount of cash on hand or uses tangible personalty in a profession or
65. It may be a small point but birthday or birthdate can be ambiguous (and
illustrative nevertheless of the problem language causes). Birthday or birthdate can
mean both the date of birth and the anniversary of that date. Thus, the term "twenty-
fifth birthdate" could mean the date on which a person becomes twenty-four years old.
Since our culture dates the age of a person by the number of full years he or she has
lived, the phrase "the age of twenty-five years" should not be ambiguous.
66. It is possible (however most unlikely in our situation) that all of testators
children would have predeceased him leaving only more remote descendants as members
of the class labeled issue. Although the traditional notion of per stirpital distribution
indicates no generation is to be skipped (even a generation in which there are no living
persons) in making an allocation, the level at which the stirpes or stocks are determined
should be specified and not be left for resolution through a construction suit. Classic
cases with this problem are Maud v. Catherwood, 67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 155 P.2d 111
(1945); and Balch v. Stone, 149 Mass. 39, 20 N.E. 322 (1889). Under former law,
realty in North Carolina always descended per stirpes, Ellis v. Harrison, 140 N.C. 444,
53 S.E. 299 (1906), Clement v. Cauble, 55 N.C. 82 (1854); but see Crump v. Faucett,
70 N.C. 345 (1874); and apparently a generation with no living members was counted,
McCall & Langston, A New Intestate Succession Statute for North Carolina, 11 N.C.L.
REv. 266, 291 (1933).
67. Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867
(1963).
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business, the clause should be altered to specify whether the cash 8 or
business property is encompassed by the phrase.09
The disposition of tangible personalty is separated from the dispo-
sition of all other property for several reasons. Quite often these items
can be distributed and enjoyed by the distributee prior to the age at
which the balance of the estate should be transferred to him. Moreover,
these items often are not particularly suitable for a trust. Here only the
children are takers of tangible personal property while issue (that is,
both children and descendants of deceased children) are the benefi-
ciaries of the contingent trust provisions. The type of property dictates
this distinction in most cases. The monetary value generally is small,
not justifying retention for grandchildren or more remote descendants.
The principal value is emotional and the sentiment inhering in the
property is important primarily to the children.
Since we are drafting a plan for a young family that will take
effect, if at all, within five to ten years, the children, if they take,
probably will be minors. Some items of tangible personalty should be
held until the recipients are of a suitable age and discretion. The
mechanism used is distribution to the trustee (following decision by the
personal representative that the items should be retained rather than
sold). An equally good alternative would be distribution to the guardian
of the minor's person to be held by him for the child.
If all the children are minors it is unlikely that disputes will arise
between them as to which person takes what items. However, since one
or more could be of age and since distribution of family heirlooms and
the like seems to precipitate controversies, a "family harmony" clause
has been inserted. The mere presence of this clause should encourage
the recipients to compromise their differences. An alternative is to
stipulate that the personal representative allocate the items to the takers
in equal shares, the decision of the personal representative being final.
68. One commentator opines that "cash on hand" would be considered to be tangi-
ble personal property, WACHOVIA WILL MANUAL, supra note 11, § IV-2, n.2; but other
authority indicates that cash is not normally thought of as tangible personal property, In
re Pergament's Estate, 204 Misc. 384, 388, 123 N.Y.S.2d 150, 154 (Sur. Ct. 1953).
69. Since testators intent controls the content and meaning of the terms he uses,
there are many decisions finding particular items are within or outside the scope of
phrases like "household goods" or "personal effects," e.g., in Jones v. Callahan, 242 N.C.
566, 89 S.E.2d 111 (1955), the court determined that an automobile was not included in
a disposition of "all my household and kitchen furniture, jewelry, clothing and other
articles of personal property used in and around my home." The existence of such
decisions, however, does not imply a need to enumerate a list of inclusions so long as the
label is the broad phrase "tangible personal property" and not a restricted term such as
"personal effects" or "property used in and around the home."
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Some clients will want to make specific bequests of certain items.
Then the disposition here would refer to "such of the balance of my
tangible personal property." A few specific bequests present no signifi-
cant problem 70 but longer, itemized lists are awkward in the will and
frequently must be redrafted in a codicil as the client has a change of
mind. A separate listing outside the will of property and recipients that
can be changed from time to time appeals to many clients. If change
after execution of the will is to be made, such a revised list, of course,
cannot be incorporated by reference. 7 Even though the outside list
may not legally be controlling, there is no reason to shy away from it if
the clients are ones who want the freedom to make frequent changes of
this kind, so long as they realize that such a list is not binding on anyone
and that realization is reflected in the will.7 2  The mere presence of a
list, while not legally binding, may act as a deterrent to family disputes
over tangible personalty.
Although income earned during probate administration by an es-
tate of this size will be minimal and, therefore, the income tax conse-
quences are not significant planning factors, it should be noted that
specific bequests of tangible personal property and even the bequest of
all tangible personalty separate from the residuary bequests have the
advantage of not carrying out estate taxable income when distribution of
this property is made.73
Residue. The balance of the estate goes to issue74 rather than to
70. One drafting problem is to remember the alternative events which may come to
pass. For example, if the wife wishes to leave her diamond ring to her daughter, we
must first determine whether this should go to the daughter even if the husband survives.
If the husband is to take and then the daughter from him, the husband's will must
contain a provision along these lines: "If I survive my wife and at the time of my death
own the diamond ring which presently belongs to her, I bequeath that ring to my
daughter Christine if she survives me."
71. The list as it exists at the time of execution of the will could be incorporated
validly by appropriate reference in the will. However, the list must be in existence when
the will is executed, Watson v. Hinson, 162 N.C. 72, 82, 77 S.E. 1089, 1093 (1913), and
later modifications would have no effect. If modifications were made, it could be
difficult to prove which portions of the list existed on date of execution of the will and
which were modifications.
72. Language the draftsman might consider is: "I have made a list of various items
of tangible personal property which I would like distributed to particular persons. I shall
probably change such list from time to time. While I realize this is not legally binding,
it is my hope that whoever takes such items under this will will respect my wishes and
voluntarily will give them to the persons indicated on the list."
73. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 663(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1 (1956). Since
the bequest to the Wilson children consists of items to be selected by the personal
representative as appropriate for distribution to them, the bequest may not qualify under
the regulation as "[s]pecific property ...ascertainable under the terms of a testator's
will as of the date of his death." Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(b) (1956).
74. Issue is defined under Article V, see text accompanying note 98 infra, but, of
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children. Issue who have attained the stipulated age for outright distri-
bution receive their shares directly from the probate estate so that the
expense and delay of channeling them through the trustee are avoided.
Shares for all under age twenty-five are kept in a common fund and
delivered to the named trustee.
IV
TRUST FOR ISSUE
This trust is established for the benefit of my issue75 from time
to time living who have not attained twenty-five (25) years
of age and who do not have a parent who received either a part
of the residue outright at my death under Article III or a portion
of the corpus of this trust subsequently at age twenty-five (25).
Income: The net income shall be accumulated and thereafter
treated as corpus.78
Corpus: From the corpus of the trust, Trustee shall pay from
time to time to or for the benefit17 of such one or more benefi-
ciaries such variable amounts (even to the exhaustion of the
trust) as are appropriate, in the discretion of the Trustee, for
course, the definition is modified by the added stipulation that those who take free of
trust have their shares determined according to a per stirpital scheme of distribution. It
is insufficient to indicate the takers (issue) without further stipulating the shares for
each taker (per stirpes) inasmuch as takers might be intended to share per capita, per
stirpes, or in the same manner as under the jurisdiction's law of intestate succession. 2
L. SIMEs & A. SMrrH, THE LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 743-46 (2d ed. 1956). In this
regard it is important to note that the North Carolina intestate succession law utilizes the
concept of representation to ascertain the number of shares to allocate to members of
more remote generations but distributes per capita at the level of each generation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. 88 29-1 to -30 (1966, Cum. Supp. 1975); McCall, North Carolina's
New Intestate Succession Act: Its History and Philosophy, 39 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1960).
Therefore, the scheme in the will departs from the concept in the Intestate Succession Act.
75. See notes 74 supra, 98 infra.
76. If income is accumulated and not distributed before the end of the trust's
taxable year (or, at trustee's election, within sixty-five days after the close of its taxable
year), the trust has undistributed net income for fiduciary income tax purposes. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 663(b), 665. When this undistributed net income later is
distributed, it will be taxed to the recipient as if it had been received by that person in
the year in which the trust received it. Id. § 665-68. It is most unlikely that the
trustee of the trust under consideration will have an excess of income over the needs of
the beneficiaries. Consequently, it will, in fact, distribute income through invasions of
corpus and not be subject to the special tax rules concerning accumulations of income.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(28) (1966), which specifies one of the powers
incorporated by reference in Article V of the will, authorizes the trustee to pay directly
to third parties for support, education and medical care of a minor or incompetent.
However, since some of the beneficiaries will be over age eighteen, the phrase "or for the
benefit of" is necessary to permit such direct payment on behalf of adult beneficiaries.
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support and care where the beneficiary is not self-supporting
through no fault of his own,78 for education (defined as four years
of college,79 or equivalent preparation in business, technical or
trade training) if the beneficiary strives therefor in good faith"'
and for extraordinary requirements occasioned by illness or other
misfortune. Amounts of corpus so distributed shall not be taken
into account in making the division of the trust when a benefi-
ciary attains the age for distribution to him provided below.81 It
is my expectation and intention that if guardians of the person
are appointed for a minor child, Trustee will exercise the fore-
going power in order to supply funds to the guardians adequate to
maintain and support the minor child and to protect the guardians,
to the extent possible, from suffering any significant financial bur-
den by reason of their appointment 2
When each beneficiary attains the age of twenty-five (25)
years, Trustee shall pay to him the share to which he would be
entitled if the then existing trust fund were distributed to my issue
then living, per stirpes, on the hypothesis that my only issue then
78. The beneficiary of a small trust is not likely to look to the trust for his support.
Nevertheless, this phrase discourages any such ideas and gives the trustee authority to cut
off any beneficiary it believes is shirking work. Many clients will find the language
appealing.
79. A limited definition is placed on education so that the eldest child does not
claim a disproportionate share of the funds. Four years of college is not necessarily the
same as an undergraduate college education. If the latter term were used, a beneficiary
might be tempted to stretch out the time required for him to obtain a degree.
80. "Striving in good faith" may be a difficult standard to administer. Neverthe-
less, testator is giving leverage and authority to the trustee and clearly indicating his
basic intent.
81. This sentence furthers testators basic intent that the respective uneven needs of
the beneficiaries be the frustee's guide to intermediate distributions and it ties into the
direction to give varying amounts to the beneficiaries if appropriate. If strict equality
were a basic goal, the trustee could be directed to record all invasions of corpus and,
each time a beneficiary attains age twenty-five, to take the invasions for him into
account in determining the amount then to be distributed. Such a direction likely would
encourage the trustee to make invasions in roughly equal amounts and not to deviate
from uniform treatment of all beneficiaries, thus defeating testator's intent in part. See
note 91 infra.
82. If a guardianship were involved, the general guardian or guardian of the estate
would be entitled to use the income from the ward's estate for education and mainte-
nance. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-42 (1966). Here testator's intent is clearly that the
trustee use both income and corpus for the specified needs of the children. While a
guardian who is not a parent of the ward should not be personally responsible for the
ward's support, the guardian could feel awkward in requesting funds; and the trustee
might question the extent to which funds could be advanced to the guardian which might
benefit guardian's family as well as the ward. This sentence acknowledges the problem
area, states intent and thereby facilitates the resolution of difficulties.
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living are such beneficiary and all younger beneficiaries of this
trust.
This trust shall terminate when the youngest beneficiary at-
tains the age of twenty-five (25) years."3 If this last beneficiary
dies before attaining that age, then upon his death Trustee shall
distribute the fund to my issue then living, per stirpes.A'"
If, at the end of any accounting period, the current market
value of the corpus of the trust does not exceed Ten Thousand
Dollars ($10,000), the corpus shall forthwith be paid to the bene-
ficiaries of the trust then living,85 per stirpes (my children to be
the stocks); provided that if a distributee is a minor, his share
83. The language describing time of trust termination must be precise. If the time
were stated to be "when the youngest beneficiary attains twenty-five" without a further
disposition in the event of death under that age, and, say, the youngest died at age twenty
when another beneficiary was age twenty-four, it would be unclear whether testator
intended termination (1) when the youngest died (without having attained the specified
age), (2) when there is no beneficiary living who is under age twenty-five, or (3) when
the youngest would have attained twenty-five had he lived. See Parker v. Parker, 252
N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960); Green v. Green, 9 Ohio Misc. 15, 221 N.E.2d 388 (P.
Ct. 1966); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Explanatory Notes § 295, comment k, at 1593-
94 (1940); 2 L SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 74, § 646. Since the first sentence of
Article IV defines beneficiaries as living issue, it should be clear this provision means a
living person attaining twenty-five.
84. The class of testator's issue obviously will have a different composition if living
refers to time of trust termination than to testator's death. Thus, in order to avoid
ambiguity, phrases like "my living issue" or "my surviving issue" cannot be used unless
there is a clear indication of the point in time to which "living" or "surviving" refers. In
the absence of such an indication rules of construction are employed. Generally (always
subject to testators intention, to the extent it can be determined), when the word
"surviving" or "living" applies to the members of a class receiving an outright gift, the
test is applied at testator's death, but when the class takes after a prior particular estate,
the test of survivorship is applied to the termination of the particular estate, which is to
say that the terms "surviving" or "living" are taken to refer to the time of distribution
and not to the death of testator. Kale v. Forrest, 278 N.C. 1, 178 S.E.2d 622 (1971);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 251 (1940); 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 74, § 577;
cf. Roberts v. Northwestern Bank, 271 N.C. 292, 156 S.E.2d 229 (1967). Within the
term "per stirpes" there is the condition a taker survive to the point of distribution. 5
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.13 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). Thus, the phrase "then
living, per stirpes" is partially redundant. However, in Roberts v. Northwestern Bank,
supra, the gift to those who took upon the death of testator's daughter (the life tenant of
a trust) was expressed as: "in equal shares, per stirpes, to my other children and my
stepdaughter." The court described this language as "the indiscriminate use of the term
per stirpes by the draftsman of testator's will." 271 N.C. at 295, 156 S.E.2d at 232. No
doubt, the language was inconsistent, at best. Nevertheless, it may be wise not to rely
solely on the term per stirpes to express a condition of survival.
85. This provision for early termination in the event the value of the trust falls
below a stipulated minimum recognizes that there is a point where the expense of the
trust outweighs its advantages. Choosing the minimum amount calls for comparing the
value to the client of expert management and postponed distribution with the size of the
trustee's fee. Thus, the $10,000 minimum used here is only illustrative and, if anything,
is a relatively low amount to use.
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shall be paid to, and held, administered and distributed by, Trus-
tee as Custodian for said minor under the North Carolina Gifts
to Minors Act as that Act exists at the execution of this will and,
for this purpose, that Act is incorporated by reference.8 6
If this trust is still in existence on the date that is twenty-one
(21) years after the death of the last to die of my issue living at
my death, Trustee shall divide the fund, per stirpes, among the
then beneficiaries of the trust (my children to be the stocks). 87
The share of each beneficiary shall be paid to him, provided that
Trustee shall hold, administer and distribute the share of any dis-
tributee who then is a minor as Custodian in accordance with
the proviso in the last preceeding paragraph. 88
Comment on Article IV
The trust, consisting of the residue determined by Article III, is
kept in one common fund for the benefit of all children under age
86. In order to avoid guardianship proceedings for the share of any beneficiary
who is a minor when the trust terminates under the clause (which proceedings could be
as expensive as continuation of the trust), the trustee will retain a minor's portion acting
as a custodian under the North Carolina Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 33-68 to -77 (1966, Cum. Supp. 1975). The Act authorizes gifts by will to a
custodian so long as the intent is expressed in the will to incorporate by reference the
provisions of the Act as they exist at the time the will is executed. Id. § 33-69.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1975). The gift upon termination of the trust should qualify under this statutory
authority.
87. The last beneficiary of the trust could be a grandchild or more remote
descendant of testator who was not alive at testators death. Such a beneficiary would
not be a measuring life for purposes of the Rule against Perpetuities and he or she might
not attain the age of twenty-five years before the expiration of twenty-one years after the
death of the last to die of all beneficiaries living at testator's death. Thus, there is a
violation of the Rule against Perpetuities but for this so-called savings clause. A
disposition is void if there is any possibility of a violation of the Rule regardless of its
probability. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 84, § 24.21.
88. The common law Rule against Perpetuities requires vesting in interest (or
failure to vest) within the perpetuity period. It does not require vesting in possession
and enjoyment. Thus, a private trust is not void solely because it might continue in
existence for more than lives in being plus twenty-one years, and a beneficial interest
which becomes indefeasible within the permitted period complies with the Rule. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 33-71(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975) requires the custodian to pay the property to
the minor upon his reaching age eighteen or to his estate if he dies before reaching that
age. Hence the minor's interest is indefeasibly vested. Commentators have suggested that
there is or should be a separate doctrine limiting the duration of a private trust of even
an indefeasible interest, see, e.g., 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 74, § 1391, at 240:
'The policy ...would seem to be expressed by the following proposition: A private
trust cannot be made indestructible, by its terms, for a longer period than a life or
lives in being and twenty-one years beyond." Several decisions in North Carolina ap-
peared to accept such a separate doctrine, Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d
229 (1949); American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1948);
but these cases, insofar as they cast doubt on trusts of vested interests, were repudiated
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twenty-five and also for more remote descendants under that age if their
parent did not receive a final distribution of his or her share. Issue has
been defined carefully in Article V so that, for example, both a grand-
child of testator, age two, and his or her parent, age twenty-three (a child
of testator), would be beneficiaries. The trustee could benefit either or
both as the trustee determined appropriate after measuring the needs of
each along with the needs of other beneficiaries under the standards
provided. In this example, the grandchild would cease being a benefi-
ciary when the parent attained twenty-five and received his or her per
stirpital share.5 9
This is a multiple purpose fund that is available not only for
education, but also for ordinary care and support, extraordinary health
care and other emergency needs.9 0 The trustee clearly is directed to
sprinkle the corpus among the beneficiaries according to their needs.
Equality of treatment is eschewed specifically.91 Final distributions to
each beneficiary of his share of testator's estate are made when the
beneficiary attains the age of twenty-five years. Thus, the common
fund will decrease as beneficiaries attain that age, eventually leaving
only the share of the youngest to satisfy that person's needs.
The creation and size of the common fund reflect a compromise
between alternatives. To illustrate the variety of designs available to the
draftsman, brief mention is made of seven different ways of creating
trust(s) to protect minors and provide essential needs when both par-
ents are deceased.
(1). Testator's entire estate is allocated into separate shares at his
death, by per stirpital distribution. Each child thereby is treated equal-
ly, but each recipient's portion is the maximum available for him or her
regardless of differing needs. The separate shares can be held in trust
in McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 743, 68 S.E.2d 831, 836
(1952) and the repudiation has been confirmed, Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 258 N.C. 371, 378, 128 S.E.2d 867, 873 (1963).
89. If the child died before attaining age twenty-five, the grandchild, of course,
would continue to be a trust beneficiary and (along with any siblings) would be entitled
to an outright share by representation upon attaining age twenty-five.
90. The standards actually are quite restrictive. If more funds were available, the
draftsman might authorize the trustee to make distributions for the general welfare or
even happiness of beneficiaries. Moreover, the purposes and objectives could be more
broadly stated to allow, for example, invasions to provide a beneficiary with funds to
purchase a home or to embark upon a business venture.
91. Absent a clear indication of the purposes for which distributions are to be made
and that inequality is both permissible and required if circumstances dictate, a trustee
likely will revert to the traditional and presumptively safe approach of equal disrtibutions
of income alone. See Bush, The Utility of Discretionary Trusts in Estate Planning,
N.Y.U. 26th INST. ON FED. TAx. 1305, 1325 (1967).
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until the recipients respectively attain the age set for outright distribu-
tion.
(2). A separate educational trust is carved out of testator's assets
and funded according to a formula, e.g., an amount determined by
multiplying the total number of years of college education remaining for
all children (maximum per child being four years) times $2,500.2 The
balance of the testator's assets at death are allocated, per stirpes, to all
recipients, and the share of each who has not attained the age stipulated
for outright distribution is held in trust until such age is attained.
(3). Same as (2) except that the shares for all who are under the
age for outright distribution are aggregated and held in a common trust
from which distributions can be made in varying amounts based upon
need. The testator must choose when the common fund is to be
allocated into separate shares, e.g., (a) when the oldest attains the
stipulated age, or (b) when the youngest reaches that age, or (c) when
the needs of all have been satisfied.9 3
(4). No separate educational trust; allocation into shares at testa-
tor's death with those over the stipulated age taking outright and those
under that age becoming beneficiaries of one common trust. Each time
a beneficiary of the trust reaches the age which entitles him or her to
take free of trust, a share is peeled off and distributed outright to that
person.
(5). Same design as (4) except that as each beneficiary of the
trust becomes entitled to an outright share, he or she takes a reduced
amount (such as one-half) in order to give more assurance that an
adequate fund is left for the needs of the youngest beneficiaries. When
the trust terminates the balance remaining, if any, is distributed among
all who took reduced shares.
(6). Testator's entire estate is held in trust until the needs of the
youngest child have been satisfied at which point the trust corpus is
allocated. The shares of the recipients who then are still under the age
for outright distribution are held in separate trusts until the date for each
is attained.
92. The formula can use any number of years and any amount per year. Quite
often the figure will be inadequate even at the time the will is executed. However,
potential assets available simply may not be sufficient to pay all education expenses and,
moreover, clients may desire their children to contribute to their own education through
scholarships, loans or part-time employment.
93. The choice of the alternative fixing the time for outright distibution will de-
pend upon the client's assessment of several different factors such as age disparity and
strength of desire for strict equality. For a discussion of the latter factor, see note 97
and accompanying text infra.
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(7). Same as (6) except there is no allocation into separate
shares until the youngest child has attained the age at which he or she is
entitled to receive a share free of trust. The trust is allocated, distributed
and completely terminated at that point.
This smorgasbord of alternative designs is only illustrative. Many
variations are possible. Common and often desirable modifications that
could be incorporated into any of the foregoing examples include:
making the outright distribution on an installment basis at different
ages, e.g., twenty-five and thirty, or twenty-five, thirty and thirty-five; "4
broadening or narrowing the purposes for which invasions of corpus can
be made, e.g., education could be defined to include postgraduate
education plus camp, travel and other informal training; and providing
trust arrangements, including age distribution requirements, for issue of
deceased children.
While there are factors that influence the ultimate choice between
alternative designs of the trust, it is difficult, in the abstract, to indicate
compelling reasons for the choice of one over the others since the
evaluation of the different patterns rests upon hopes, desires and attitudes
of individual clients faced with the uniqueness of their families. Never-
theless, some considerations deserve attention since they do enter both
into the attorney's intial decision to present a design to the client for
consideration and into the discussion that must occur between attorney
and client prior to the client's selection of his or her preference.
A significant age disparity between the oldest and youngest children
points toward the selection of a scheme that will give the older children
something immediately at testator's death or as soon as the children
attain the age the parent decides is appropriate for outright distribution.
Somehow it seems unfair to make some wait many years, until the very
youngest has all needs satisfied, for a share of the parent's wealth. Thus,
the presence of a broad range in ages makes more attractive the forego-
ing designs numbered (1) through (4).
Size of estate is another important consideration. The greater the
value of assets the easier it is to believe that the needs of younger family
94. Installments generally would be equal fractions at the different dates, i.e. one-
third at twenty-five, one-third at thirty and one-third at thirty-five (probably better
expressed as one-third at twenty-five, one-half the balance at thirty, and the remaining
fund at thirty-five). However, the periodic partial distributions could be made unequal
for several reasons. The amounts in the early installments could be larger in order to
provide extra funds for needs like purchasing a home. Alternatively, the early install-
ments might be smaller in order to maintain a larger trust corpus and thereby to provide
greater security to the younger beneficiaries while still providing something free of trust
for the older ones.
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members can be satisfied out of his or her equal share. Also, a larger
estate is more susceptible to division simultaneously between an educa-
tional trust and separate shares for individuals. Thus, designs (1)
through (3) are more likely used when ample funds are present. On
the other hand, as the value of assets available diminishes, there is
concern whether those funds are sufficient to meet the needs of younger
children let alone yield a share for the older ones. In these situations
designs (5) through (7) are more attractive.
Identity of trustee and trustee fees are considerations that interact
with the size of the estate. Where a corporate fiduciary is used, its fee
schedule likely stipulates a minimum fee for each separate trust.95
Where assets are small or modest this means it is prohibitively expeisive
to establish separate trusts for each recipient and perhaps even too
expensive to set up a separate educational trust. Costs can. be reduced
and the advantage of a corporate trustee obtained through use of a
single trust as suggested in designs (4) through (7).91 Some or all of
the expense can be avoided if an individual, particularly a family
member, is named trustee. While this may permit creation. of multiple
trusts, the savings, of course could be illusory if the individual named
lacks the expertise necessary for proper administration of the assets
involved.
Testator's feelings about equality between children must be consid-
ered and explored in some depth. Several of the alternatives [(1) and
(4) particularly and (2), (3) and (5) to a lesser extent] allocate a
share to older children who, because of their age at testator's death have
received many benefits not yet obtained by the younger ones. The
younger children must pay for these benefits out of their separate shares.
In (6) and (7), on the other hand, the needs of all are met before any
excess is distributed. Absolute equality can never be assured if the
focus is on needs since requirements will vary, but the holdback until
certain basic requirements have been met for everyone has a connotation
of greater fairness. If equality is an overriding concern and a single
95. The fee is generally computed as a p6rcentage of the fair market value of the
assets with an annual minimum. See, e.g., WACHOVIA WIL MANUAL, supra note 11, at
xvi (Schedule of Compensation).
96. Invariably the trustee fee will also be less when the fund is fully invested in a
common trust fund rather than invested separately. The Wachovia Bank & Trust Com-
pany fee schedule, see note 95 supra, prescribes a minimum of $250 per year fee for a
trust invested in a common trust fund and $800 per year for a trust that is separately
invested. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(3) (1966), which is incorporated into the will by
the reference under Powers in Article V, specifically authorizes the trustee to invest in
common trust funds.
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trust for multiple beneficiaries is used, the trustee could be directed to
take into account the invasions made for each beneficiary when trustee
allocates to separate shares at the termination of the trust, 7 although
this involves significant accounting problems for trustee.
As a gloss on all the factors there could be special, uncommon
needs of some beneficiaries that require radical departure from typical
arrangements. A child with a mental handicap may require a trust for
his or her share to last during lifetimae. The same or a different
disability could present such a need for funds that a large proportion of
testator's wealth is allocated for the benefit of one person. Testator may
want to meet these demands and skew the distribution to achieve that
result or, alternatively, he or she may decide equality or some other
concern is an equally important goal, thus neutralizing the special need.
Here as elsewhere there is no scale for weighing the factors-the balance
must be struck by the client after pertinent advice and consultation with
the attorney.
The will for R. Michael Wilson utilizes the design referred to
above as (4). The assets are modest so that the single fund is more
attractive than separate individual trusts or a separate educational trust.
There is no significant age disparity between the Wilson children so that
there would be little hardship in making the elder wait for distribution of
his share until the needs of his sister have been satisfied. The small
difference in age also means it is unlikely that carving off the elder's
share when he is twenty-five will give him much more than the amount
his sister has or will receive. Thus, the design chosen is a fair compro-
mise. An additional feature of the trust is coverage for issue of children
who are under age twenty-five or who die before attaining that age. If
the clients' situation changes through birth or adoption of additional
children by the time the will is revised, perhaps five years after execu-
tion, a design different than (4) might then be selected to take account
of problems created by the new age disparity.
V
MISCELLANEOUS
Powers: I give my fiduciaries, including successor fiduciaries, all
97. Trustee would have to keep a record of all discretionary distributions for each
beneficiary. When a person became entitled to his or her outright share, trustee would
compute an augmented fund consisting of the trust fund as then constituted plus all
distributions to then beneficiaries (such transfers taken at their values when distributed).
The fractional share would be computed on the augmented fund and the beneficiary
charged with all prior distributions to him.
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the powers contained in North Carolina General Statutes, Sec-
tion 32-27 at the time of the execution of this will, and those
powers are incorporated by reference.
Survival Defined: No person shall be deemed to have survived
me or to be living at my death if he shall die within ninety (90)
days after my death.
Issue Defined: The term issue means all my lineal descendants,
immediate and remote, living on the date the persons who com-
prise that class must be ascertained. 8 When distribution is to
issue, per stirpes, distribution shall be by right of representation,
my children to be the stocks. 9
Adoption: Where a person has been adopted prior to attaining
the age of eighteen (18) years, such person shall be treated for all
purposes of this will as the natural child of the adopting parents.
Taxes and Other Charges: All taxes imposed by reason of my
death shall be paid by my Executor as an expense of administra-
tion. My Executor shall not attempt to have any part of such
taxes apportioned among the recipients of property includible in
determining the amount of such taxes. Proceeds of insurance on
my life up to the maximum allowable as an exemption from North
Carolina inheritance tax and distributions from pension and profit-
sharing plans exempt from federal estate tax, all of which are
payable to my Trustee or any beneficiary (other than my estate),
shall not be used to pay debts, taxes, expenses of administration
or other charges against my estate.
Testamentary Guardian: In the event my wife fails to survive
me, I nominate and appoint her brother and his wife, James R.
and Gertrude E. Jones of Alexandria, Virginia, as testamentary
guardians of the person and Worthy Bank & Trust Company as
guardian of the estate of any of my children who is a minor at
the time of my death. If either of my wife's brother and his wife
is unable or unwilling so to act, I nominate and appoint my sister
and her husband, Norma W. and Robert J. Thornberry of Ashe-
ville, North Carolina, as testamentary guardians of the person
of any of said children.
98. For comment on the possible difficulties with using the word "issue" without
definition, see note 74 supra and Phillips, Some Suggestions To Will Draftsmen:
Complex Dispositive Plans in General, Class Gift Provisions in Particular, 40 N.C.L.
Rav. 23, 34-35 &n.18 (1961).
99. See note 66 supra.
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Insurance: Certain policies of insurance on my life name my wife
as primary beneficiary and my surviving issue, per stirpes, as con-
tingent beneficiaries with a proviso that the share of any taker under
the age of twenty-five (25) be paid to the Trustee under this will.100
A further proviso permits payment to my estate if the trust is not
established within six months of my death or the insurer concludes
payment cannot be made to the Trustee. Notwithstanding any
provision to the contrary relative to the distribution of my prop-
erty, if insurance proceeds are paid to my estate pursuant to the
contingent beneficiary designation, they shall be allocated to the
testamentary trust established under Article IV without further
subdivision.
Ultimate Takers: If, at any time, there is no one to take under
the terms of this will or the trust described in Article IV, my
fiduciary shall pay over half the fund to those persons who would
take my estate if I had then died intestate, unmarried, domiciled
in North Carolina, under the laws of North Carolina then in effect,
the shares and proportions to be determined by said laws and the
balance to those persons who would take my wife's estate if she
had then died intestate, unmarried, domiciled in North Carolina,
under the laws of North Carolina then in effect, the shares and
proportions to be determined by said laws.
No Implied Contract: This will is being executed on the same
date as is the will of my wife; but in no event shall our wills be
considered joint or mutual,101 it being our express intention that
the survivor shall in no way be restricted in the use, management,
enjoyment or disposition of his separate estate or property re-
ceived under the other's will.
Comment on Article V
Powers. The statutory powers are broad and adequate. There is no
reason to go to the expense of creating alternative provisions.'0 2 Client
100. A suggested beneficiary designation is given in note 49 supra.
101. A will is joint when two persons execute a single instrument intending it be the
will of each. Wills are mutual when each person executes a separate instrument
containing reciprocal provisions. A joint and mutual will would be a single instrument
containing reciprocal provisions executed by two or more persons. Courts tend to stray
from these definitions and to refer to separate wills with reciprocal provisions as either
joint or mutual.
102. Nor should the statutory powers be incorporated and the substance of the same
powers be stated in different language in the will. Although some form books use this
double statement of powers (e.g., NORTH CAROLINA NAT'L BANK, VILL AND TRUST
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relations can be strengthened by appending a copy of the powers to the
client's copy of the will. Moreover, the attorney's file must reflect the
language of the statute on the date of execution since later amendments
to the statute do not modify the provisions incorporated by reference.
Survival Defined. A beneficiary who dies within ninety days of
the decedent certainly will not have an opportunity to receive and enjoy
the property given to him or her. Therefore, a survivorship period is
required in order to reduce the expense and inconvenience that would
result from a double probate.103
Adoption. By statute an adopted person comes within the scope
of such words as child, grandchild, heir, issue or descendant unless a
contrary intent appears in the will, deed, or other writing. 04 Neverthe-
less, there are good reasons for inserting this provision into the will. It
emphasizes the statutory treatment thereby assuring that testator focuses
on a question which he might otherwise overlook. Perhaps more im-
portantly this paragraph addresses the problem of adoption of an adult,
often done for the sole purpose of qualifying the adoptee for inheritance
or succession benefits.' 0 5 This provision excludes a person adopted after
MANUAL C-2, -3 (1975), it would seem that the difference in language invites dispute
over the scope of the powers.
103. If the testator's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes will exceed $60,000
and qualification for the marital deduction is deemed advantageous, this definition of
survival should not apply to the spouse. In those circumstances there should be added a
presumption of the spouse's survival in the event it is difficult or impossible to determine
the order of survivorship. If a requirement of survival for a period up to six months is
imposed on the surviving spouse and the spouse actually survives that period, the
presence of the survivorship condition (which did not occur in fact) will not adversely
affect the allowance of a marital deduction, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(3).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23(3) (1966); see Peele v. Finch, 284 N.C. 375, 200
S.E.2d 635 (1973). A prior decision, Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632
(1953), had indicated that the word "issue" connoted a biological relationship. Under
the present statute, if that is the testator's intent he must clearly state it.
105. See generally Wadlington, Adoption of Adults: A Family Law Anomaly, 54
CORNELL L. REv. 566 (1969). Kentucky has struggled mightily with the question
whether an adult adoptee is eligible for membership within a class described by a testator
who predeceased the adoption by many years. The court went full circle from Woods v.
Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W.2d 680 (1940) (denying an adoptee the status as heir or
child of the adoptor), through Bedinger v. Graybill's Executor & Trustee, 302 S.W.2d
594 (Ky. 1957) (permitting the wife who was adopted by her husband to qualify as
rightful taker under the language "heirs at law of [husband]"), and Wilson v. John-
son, 389 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1965) (finding a -distinction between "heir" and "chil-
dren" so that an adoption of an adult qualifies that person as a taker when the label is
the former but not the latter) to Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 419
S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967) (recognizing that the adoption laws were being used to thwart
testators' intentions and stating, therefore, that "[adoption of an adult for the purpose
of bringing that person under the provisions of a preexisting testamentary instrument
when he clearly was not intended to be so covered should nbt be permitted . . . " id. at
344). Testator's intent should control on the question whether an adopted person is a
rightful taker. Therefore, his intent must be stated.
310 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
becoming an adult;10 6 age eighteen is chosen because it coincides with
the age of majority.
Taxes. In North Carolina, absent a contrary direction, death taxes
are a charge against property passing by intestacy first and then against
the probate assets 10 7 and, apparently, taxes will come from the probate
assets according to the normal rules of abatement. 08 This rule means
the dispositive pattern of the will can be distorted materially if nonpro-
bate assets are substantial and go to persons other than the beneficiaries
under the will (or go to the same persons but in substantially different
proportions) .109 Therefore, the draftsman should consider the problem
for every will he or she prepares and include a tax clause specifying the
fund(s) from which death duties are to be paid. Here taxes are to be
paid as an expense of administration and not apportioned among the
beneficiaries. The effect is to place the burden on the residue (trust) to
the relief of the takers of tangible personal property. Life insurance
and retirement plan benefits payable to the testamentary trustee are
relieved of liability for debts, taxes and expenses of administration in
order to preserve tax exemptions for those assets."10
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-36(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975) permits adoption of an adult
person by a married couple or a single person, and id. § 48-36(b) states, "the rights,
duties and obligations of the adoptive parents and the person adopted shall be, in relation
to each other, and in relation to all other persons, the same . . . as if the adoption had
taken place immediately before the person adopted became 18 years of age . . . ." Id. §
48-36(c) states that other provisions of the adoption statutes do not apply to adoption of
adults except as provided in subsection (b) (and other subsections not relevant here). A
rather convincing argument can be made that subsection (b) and both the apparent
legislative intent and broad language of the statute which brings "any adopted person"
within the class of child, heir, issue, etc., sanction adoption of an adult solely for the
purpose of affecting preexisting testamentary arrangements absent a contrary expression
by the creator of the arrangements. See id. § 48-23 (3) (1966) (emphasis added).
107. Buffaloe v. Barnes, 226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222 (1946) ("The ruling of the
trial judge that the federal estate tax should be paid out of the general funds of the estate
is affirmed .... The general rule, in the absence of a contrary testamentary provision,
is that the ultimate burden of an estate tax falls on the residuary estate," id. at 322, 38
S.E.2d at 228-29 (citations omitted)). Since normal rules of abatement require property
passing on partial intestacy to be used to pay estate obligations before property passing
under the will, the residuary estate is really the second fund available. In the ordinary
testate situation, of course, there is no property passing by intestacy and the residue
bears the burden of death taxes unless a contrary direction is given by testator.
108. The abatement provisions were changed effective October 1, 1975, so that both
personal property and real estate in the same classification abate ratably. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28A-15-5 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
109. For discussion of the problems created by the requirement that the probate
assets bear the tax burden, see Comment, Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax-
Should North Carolina Adopt An Apportionment Statute?, 52 N.C.L. REv. 737 (1974).
110. Life insurance proceeds to a maximum of $20,000 are exempt if paid to Class
A beneficiaries. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-3(4), -4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Proceeds
paid to a trust for the benefit of a Class A beneficiary qualify for this exemption. 34
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Testamentary Guardian."' Testator appoints a married couple to
serve as guardians of the person and substitutes another married couple
in the event either of the first nominees cannot serve.' 12  The first
couple are nonresidents, but that status does not disqualify them for the
position."13  Because the will establishes the trust for minors, it is
unlikely that a guardian of a minor's estate will be necessary. Neverthe-
less, in case a guardianship of the estate is needed, and on the theory
that it is better to have an experienced corporate fiduciary manage the
minor's assets than to place that added burden on the relatives charged
with care of his or her person, testator has designated the bank as
guardian of the estate." 4
Insurance. The provision explains the manner in which the bene-
ficiary designations and the dispositive provisions of the will have been
coordinated. The direction in the last sentence operates only if some
or all of the policy proceeds are paid to the personal representative." 5
Ultimate Takers. Testator realizes the possibility that none of his
beneficiaries will survive him. Quite likely this would result from a
-common disaster such as fire or automobile accident. This clause leaves
equal amounts to testator's family and his wife's family. A similar
provision, of course, appears in the wife's will so that the proportions
going to each family do not depend upon the fortuitous order of
death."" The paragraph also provides alternative takers if at any time
N.C. ATr'y GEN. REP. 172 (1957). The designation of a testamentary trustee as bene-
ficiary of life insurance proceeds may be troublesome. See note 49 supra. Distributions
from certain pension and profit-sharing plans received by a beneficiary other than the
personal representative are exempt from federal estate tax to the extent attributable to
employer contributions. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c). The exempt status is
retained where the recipient is a testamentary trustee so long as the distributions cannot
be used to satisfy estate obligations. Rev. Rul. 73-404, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 319.
111. See notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra.
112. There appears to be no bar against two persons occupying the office of
guardian. While N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-2 (Cum. Supp. 1975) uses guardian in the singu-
lar, there is no indication that only one person at a time may be guardian, and at least
one decision suggests multiple guardians would be acceptable. See Peyton v. Smith, 22
N.C. 325 (1839).
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-9 (1966) requires the clerk of superior court to remove
any guardian who "would be legally disqualified to be appointed administrator." Under
id. § 28A-4-2 (Cur. Supp. 1975) a nonresident is disqualified from acting as personal
representative when such a person has not appointed a resident agent. Combining these
provisions yields the conclusion that a nonresident is eligible so long as he or she
appoints a resident agent and files that appointment with the court.
114. It is not necessary that the same person or entity serve as both types of
guardian. See note 29 supra.
115. The problems which may thwart payment to the testamentary trustee and re-
quire payment to the insured's estate are described in note 49 supra.
116. If the order of death could not be determined, the Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-24-1 to -7 (Cum. Supp. 1975), applies except to the extent
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there is no one to take the trust fund. Good planning requires a
provision to cover this possibility, however remote it appears. If the will
is silent, the result would be partial intestacy, the takers being those
identified by the Intestate Succession Act applied as of testator's death-
a result not particularly satisfactory, if the contingency occurs many
years after his death.1 7 The paragraph illustrates one solution. Quite
clearly the testator may prefer different takers such as charity, always a
popular choice.
No Implied Contract. Some decisions have found contractual
obligations implied in reciprocal testamentary provisions." 8 It seems
unlikely that a young married couple would want and intend to im-
pose restrictions on the other's use of the assets. Indeed they should
be counselled against binding obligations which may be unsuitable for
changed conditions of the future. If restrictions are intended, however,
they should be expressed, preferably in a separate contract, and the wilis
should articulate their contractual nature." 9 Restrictions by implica-
tion must be avoided. Certainly litigation would be necessary to estab-
lish the contract,120 and the exact nature of the restrictions in contract
and property law terms could be difficult to articulate and prove. In
addition, if the estate were sufficiently large, adverse estate tax conse-
quences could result from the implication of restrictions on the survi-
vor's use of the property.121
the will, trust or other document of title provides differently. Since survival is defined in
this article to mean survivorship of decedent for ninety days, the spouse and children
could fail to qualify as takers under that definition and the Uniform Act would not
provide an alternative scheme of distribution.
117. The dispositive language used indicates that the shares as well as takers are to
be ascertained by reference to the laws of intestacy in effect at the time the reference to
them is required. A reference to takers "under the laws of North Carolina then in
effect" would not necessarily indicate the method of computing the share of each taker.
The uncertainty of method is heightened here because a per stirpes distribution is used in
this will, while the present North Carolina Intestate Succession Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
29-1 to -30 (1966), prescribes a division into stocks with a further allocation per capita
at each generation. See 2 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 74, § 747.
118. In Godwin v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 259 N.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 456
(1963), the court was asked whether separate wills of husband and wife were contractual
in nature where the wills contained reciprocal provisions and incorporated by reference
an inter vivos trust. Although the wills had no express statement of contractual
obligation, the court held "the wills themselves establish the existence of the contract."
Id. at 530, 131 S.E.2d at 463.
119. See generally Taylor, Estate Planning For Husband and Wife-Coordination of
Estate Plans, in N.C. BAR Ass'N, supra note 49, V-1I to -15.
120. Recent litigation has included Mansour v. Rabil, 277 N.C. 364, 177 S.E.2d 849
(1970), and Olive v. Biggs, 276 N.C. 445, 173 S.E.2d 301 (1970), both of which are
discussed in Taylor, supra note 119.
121. Estate of Robert Abruzzino, 61 T.C. 306 (1973); Estate of Opal v. Commis-
sioner, 450 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1971), affg 54 T.C. 154 (1970); cf. United States v.
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VI
FIDUCIARIES
I nominate my wife Harriet J. Wilson as Executrix of this will
to serve without bond.122  If she predeceases me, declines to
act or, having qualified, resigns, dies or is removed, I nominate
Worthy Bank & Trust Company as Executor or Administrator with
the will annexed de bonis non.
I nominate Worthy Bank & Trust Company as Trustee. My
Trustee shall not be required to file an inventory or accountings
with the clerk or the court having jurisdiction over this will.
I direct that Worthy Bank & Trust Company receive as com-
pensation for its services (as Trustee and as personal representa-
tive, if it serves in that capacity) such amounts as it customarily
charges for similar services at the time those services are performed.
Comment on Article VI
The bank is named personal representative if the spouse fails to
survive. 23 Trustee is relieved from filing an inventory and annual
accounts primarily to reduce expenses in trust administration. 24 The
relief also gives additional privacy to the beneficiaries. The last sen-
tence removes the corporate fiduciary from the strictures of any statu-
tory fee schedule and permits it to adjust its fees through the years. 25
Additional Comments
There is no provision in the will directing payment of debts. Even
Ford, 377 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1967) (contractual joint and mutual will does not disqualify
from marital deduction assets held in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship).
122. This provision is superfluous for a resident since N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-8-1
(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975) stipulates "[n]o bond shall be required of . . . a resi-
dent executor, unless the express terms of the will require him to give bond." How-
ever, a nonresident executor (including a resident who moves outside the state after
appointment by the court) who qualifies as executor by appointing a resident agent must
give bond unless excused by the express terms of the will. Id. § 28A-8-1(b)(2). A
corporate personal representative with its principal office in North Carolina is excused
from giving bond. Id. § 28A-8-1(b) (5).
123. The bank is trustee, of course, only if the spouse fails to survive.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-67 (Cum. Supp. 1975) is authority for granting this relief.
125. Id. § 28A-23-3(a) limits compensation of the fiduciary (including personal
representative and testamentary trustee) to a maximum of five percent of receipts and
expenditures. Id. § 28A-23-3 (b) stipulates real estate is subject to commission only to
the extent it is sold to pay debts and legacies. A testator may provide in his will for a
different scheme of compensation which will be binding upon the fiduciary after
acceptance of the office and upon all interested parties. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
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without it the estate is obligated to pay.1 26 If a direction to pay claims
is desired, the draftsman must recognize that new rules exist in North
Carolina regarding exoneration of encumbered property. 127 There is
no exoneration unless otherwise directed and a simple direction to pay
debts is not an exoneration provision. 28 A simple direction to pay
debts and expenses should be inserted in the wife's will; otherwise, her
surviving husband rather than her estate is liable. 129
After the wills of both husband and wife are executed, several
more steps may be necessary in order to implement the estate plan. The
spouse of the insured should be named primary beneficiary of life
insurance. The secondary beneficiaries should be the insured's issue,
per stirpes, the share of any taker under [the age stipulated in the will
for distribution outright] to be paid to the trustee under the will of the
insured. 30 Designations should be made in similar fashion for death
benefits under any retirement plans.
The turgid phraseology of all too many form books obscures intent
and makes comprehension difficult. Therefore, as the prototype will
and testamentary trust were drafted, a conscious effort was made to use
direct, precise language. To this end, favorite "trinity clauses" such as
"give, devise and bequeath" and "all property, real, personal and
mixed" have been shortened or eliminated.' 3 ' In addition, the will has
been designed so that it could serve as a form with very little modifica-
Waddell, 237 N.C. 342, 75 S.E.2d 151 (1953); Lightner v. Boone, 221 N.C. 78, 19
S.E.2d 144 (1942).
126. This is an inescapable conclusion from the provisions protecting creditors and
establishing procedures for payment of claims. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-14-1 to -3;
28A-15-1, -5, -10; 28A-19-1 to -18 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
127. Id. H9 28A-15-3 to -4.
128. Id. § 28A-15-3. Care must be taken in drafting a direction to pay debts so that
a right of exoneration is not created inadvertently.
129. The husband is primarily liable for claims against the wife's estate that
represent debts for necessaries furnished her. See Bowen v. Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242,
84 S.E. 265 (1915), which also held the husband primarily liable for the wife's funeral
expense. The wife's estate now is primarily liable for such expense. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
28A-19-8 (Cum. Supp. 1975). A provision in the wife's will directing that her estate be
primarily liable for amounts which otherwise would fall upon the husband for discharge
will be given effect. Brown v. Brown, 199 N.C. 473, 154 S.E. 731 (1930). If the
husband is liable for the wife's debts and expense of administering her estate, those items
cannot be taken as deductions in computing death taxes against her estate.
130. The practicality of this beneficiary designation and some difficulties that might
be encountered are discussed in note 49 supra.
131. There seems to be some mystical attraction to groupings of three. Some other
common examples are "make, publish and declare" and "rest, residue and remainder."
(These two examples suffice to make the point notwithstanding the temptation to add a
third!) Though the following has not appeared, surely it will come along if present




tion for the next client with a similar situation and similar desires. Since
names of children are not used and the name of the wife is used but once,
there are very few changes to be made in the body of the will to adapt
the form to the next application.13 2  To the charge that the will is
depersonalized, the answer is yes, but the deficiency is not serious and is
entirely justifiable. Forms are an absolute necessity. They enable the
attorney to supply a top quality product at modest expense. Lawyers
must be able to reuse over and over the fruits of in-depth and time-
consuming research and drafting. Documents have greater utility if
they can be prepared for broader application than the immediate task
(but, of course, without sacrificing any present objectives) or can be
modified into a general approach.
The foregoing discussion reveals that adequate, complete planning
for the client family with modest assets involves a critical examination of
alternative dispositive patterns, careful selection of a design appropriate
to the needs of the specific family, and sophistication in drafting the
testamentary instrument. Even the oft-neglected smaller estate requires
marshalling the many and varied lawyering skills. The planning solu-
tion for the hypothetical young family provides a format for transposi-
tion into other fact patterns' 33 and a guide to drafting similar wills and
trusts.
132. The "standard" portions can be stored on magnetic cards or tape for ease and
speed in retrieval and reproduction. See Allen, Law-Office Typing with the IBM
MT/ST, 16 PRAc. LAW., Apr. 1970 at 13; Stemin, Magnetic Cards-A New Medium
for Automatic Typing, 16 PRAc. LAw., Oct. 1970, at 49.
133. In the transposition, of course, the format must be tailored and refined to meet
the exact and unique needs of each client. Moreover, the use of this format is subject to
the admonition quoted in note 5 supra.
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